The US role in carrying the Kuomintang to Taiwan and helping it to manufacture the image of a Leninist dictatorship there as “Free China”

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Harvard University Press seems to have joined with the acutely anti-communist Hoover Institution (which is located in the middle of the Stanford University campus) to exculpate the Kuomintang government and army that was swept from mainland China after stockpiling weapons intended to fight against the Japanese invaders for use against the communists, whom Chiang Kai-Shek’s army had pressed north following his first white terror (in Shanghai in 1927). The story of Chiang’s evasion of US pressure (in the personal of military liaison Gen. Joe Stillwell) to fight Japan was brilliantly told by Barbara Tuchman in her Pulitzer Prize-winning 1971 Stillwell and the American Experience of China, 1911-45.

Hoover Institution Chiang apologists Tse-Han Lai, Wou Wei, and Ramon Myers published an extraordinarily tendentious account of the KMT/ROC army and secret police descending on Taiwan with lists of community leaders in hands and guns blazing even as they disembarked in Keelung Harbor in A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947, published by Stanford University Press in 1991.* Lai et al. attempted to exculpate Chiang and Chen Yi, Chief Executive and Garrison Commander of Taiwan Province, from responsibility for the slaughter, massively to underestimate the number of Taiwanese murdered by the regime the US had foisted on them (Japan has simply walked away from its colony of half a century, and the US Navy ferried ROC soldiers to Taiwan; the US conducted a plebiscite in which the people of Okinawa chose their government (Japan), but there has never been such a consultation of the people governed on Taiwan), and pretends that the systematic slaughter was a tragedy rather than a planned culling of intellectuals (etc.) who might oppose the massive KMT looting of infrastructure the Japanese had built up on Taiwan and the blatant corruption on Taiwan presided over by Chen Yi.

In 2011, Harvard’s Bellknap Press published a massive apologia for Chiang Kai-Shek written by Jay Taylor (1931-), Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China.

In 2016 Harvard University Press published Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan, by Hoover Institution curator Hsia-Ting Lin, another extended apologia for Chiang Kai-Shek’s military incompetence in losing the civil war on the Chinese mainland (and then Hainan) as he warded off competitors for US aid —which had stopped flowing before North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950. While being careful to avoid any military action to retake China, Chiang and his American advocates (“the China Lobby,” many of whom had been Christian missionaries in China; Chiang had nominally converted) presented their refuge as “Free China.” The dictatorship, ruling under martial law for nearly forty years, pretended to be a government of all of China, so that the few people it actually governed (on Taiwan) were allotted only a small share of the representatives of the “Chinese people” (Lin does not seem to have noticed that the ROC pretense considered there to be three provinces on Taiwan rather than one). Lin does not demur from the Potemkin legislature or its election, writing,

“To legitimize the Republic of China as the central government of all China, the Taipei-based Nationalist government needed elected representatives for all China. In 1947 more than one thousand mainlanders in Nanking were elected by the Chinese people [sic.] as members of the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan. After coming to Taiwan, these representative were permitted to hold their seats until the next election could be held on the mainland [i.e., never; as Lin documents, Chiang Kai-Shek had no serious plans or any serious intent to retake the mainland], thus legitimizing [!] the Republic of China’s control of the island.”

Although the ROC only ruled Taiwan and a few other islands, the claim to be the rightful government of China (a fantasy the US maintained until 1979) ensured it not being responsible to the people it governed. The consent of the governed seems as irrelevant to Chiang’s apologist(s) as it was to him. And only slightly more important to most American government officials making East Asia/West Pacific policy, though some of them did not think the ROC had sound claims to rule Taiwan (let alone China!). Far from being an “accidental state,” the ROC was a conscious confection that denied those governed by the ROC (under martial law) from self-government.

Lin repeatedly props up Chiang’s actions and reactions as “understandable” (in its adverb form). Taiwanese seeking to be governed by the US under a UN mandate preparing for independence rather than de facto Chinese colonialism (following half a century of Japanese colonialism, which was harsh but followed its laws and built up infrastructure, including an educated workforce). He chronicles dissensus both within the KMT and within its paymaster, most frequently between the US State Department and the military, particularly General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan until relieved of his command in April of 1951 in attempting to lead a war against the People’s Republic of China, that is a Third World War.

Chiang wanted a Third World War, which he hoped would include defeat of the PRC Red Army that had quickly and thoroughly defeated the ROC Army, but also did not want his troops to fight, either to retake Hainan or to open a second front for the PRC on the Asian mainland. As he had throughout the time of US engagement in fighting the Japanese, Chiang made sounds about fighting the communists. He declined actually to do either, instead concentrating on KMT infighting and suppressing dissidents in his satrapy pretending to be China. (Lin does quote Douglas MacArthur before the Korean War as judging that Chiang knew nothing of the art of war, the arts of palace intrigue and public doubletalk on the other hand, Chiang was even more accomplished than MacArthur.)

Lin barely mentions the long-running White Terror (aimed more at potential critics of Chiang than at communist sympathizers), putting that in scare quotes the only time he mentions it. That, the downplaying of Taiwanese killed by ROC occupiers, and classifying the mass murder as a “tragedy” rather than the result of conscious policy places Lin very much in the Lai and Taylor tradition of Chiang/KMT apologists. He exceeds them in blaming the observer George Kerr (Formosa Betrayed) for negligence “in the events surrounding the February 28 incident of 1947,” making me wonder which Taiwanese Kerr was responsible for slaughtering.

And Lin does not consider the extent to which the land reform (1) was aimed at breaking any power of Taiwanese elite, (2) targeted some small-holders, and (3) was not universally popular in Taiwan.

On a far less consequential level, I am sure that Lin make more mistakes in identification than two US legislators I noticed: the fervid ROC-backer (the prototypical former Christian missionary in China) Walter Judd was a US representative (from Minneapolis), not a US Senator, and the word order in the name Washington State US Representative and then US Senator is obviously “Warren Magnuson,” not “Magnuson Warren.”

Overly credulous of Chiang Kai-Shek’s diary and preoccupied by political maneuvering in both (ROC and US) governments to pay any attention to the views of the people living on Taiwan, Lin has done considerable archival research and manages to illuminate the fault line and conflicts within both governments (with the UK foreign office frequently very suspcious of Chiang and determined to avert a war across the Taiwan straits.)

*Keelung Hong and I criticized the KMT apologia at length in a review reprinted in our book Looking Through Taiwan, published by the University of Nebraska Press. Also see “Some American Witnesses of the KMT’s 1947 Reign of Terror on Taiwan, and the recent novels Green Island and 228 Legacy.

(There is also some material on maneuvering by Japan not to cede the colony it acquired China’s claims to (China had never pacified the interior of the island) to any state or international entity. Japan just renounced its claim to sovereignty of Taiwan in the 28 April 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty.)

 

The book’s cover photo shows Chiang Kai-Shek shaking hands with US General William Chase, chief of the US Military Assistance Advisory  Group  in Taipei.

 

©2016, Stephen O.Murray

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